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Abstract 
We have formerly introduced Deep Random Secrecy, a new cryptologic technique 
capable to ensure secrecy as close as desired from perfection against unlimited 
passive eavesdropping opponents. We have also formerly introduced an extended 
protocol, based on Deep Random Secrecy, capable to resist to unlimited active 
MITM. The main limitation of those protocols, in their initial presented version, is 
the important quantity of information that needs to be exchanged between the 
legitimate partners to distill secure digits. We have defined and shown existence of 
an absolute constant, called Cryptologic Limit, which represents the upper-bound 
of Secrecy rate that can be reached by Deep Random Secrecy protocols. At last, we 
have already presented practical algorithms to generate Deep Randomness from 
classical computing resources. This article is presenting two optimization 
techniques, the first one is based on recombination and reuse of random bits, the 
second is obtained by adapting sampling parameters depending on the public 
information published by the partners. These techniques enable to dramatically 
increase the bandwidth performance of formerly introduced protocols, without 
jeopardizing the entropy of secret information. That optimization enables to 
envision an implementation of Deep Random Secrecy at very reasonable cost. The 
article also summarizes former results in the perspective of a comprehensive 
implementation. 
 
Key words. Deep Random, Perfect Secrecy, Secret key agreement, Authentication against Man In The 
Middle attack, unconditional security, quantum resistant 
I. Introduction and summary of former work 
Modern cryptography mostly relies on mathematical problems commonly trusted as very difficult to 
solve, such as large integer factorization or discrete logarithm, belonging to complexity theory. No 
certainty exists on the actual difficulty of those problems. Some other methods, rather based on 
information theory, have been developed since early 90’s. Those methods relies on hypothesis about 
the opponent (such as « memory bounded » adversary [6]) or about the communication channel (such 
as « independent noisy channels » [5]) ; unfortunately, if their perfect secrecy have been proven under 
given hypothesis, none of those hypothesis are easy to ensure in practice. At last, some other methods 
based on physical theories like quantum indetermination [3] have been described and experimented, 
but they remain complex to implement. 
  
Considering this theoretically unsatisfying situation, we have proposed in [9] to explore a new path, 
where proven information theoretic security can be reached, without assuming any limitation about the 
capacities of the opponent, who is supposed to have unlimited computation and storage power, nor 
about the communication channel, that is supposed to be perfectly public, accessible and equivalent 
for any playing party (legitimate partners and opponents). Furthermore, while we were only 
considering passive unlimited opponents in [9], we consider in this work active unlimited MITM 
opponents. 
In our model of security, the legitimate partners of the protocol are using Deep Random generation to 
generate their shared encryption key, and the behavior of the opponent, when inferring secret 
information from public information, is governed by Deep Random assumption, that we introduce. In 
active opponent scenarios, the legitimate partners have an initial shared authentication secret, that is 
used only for authentication purpose, not for generating the shared encryption key. 
Back on the Deep random assumption 
We have introduced in [9] the Deep Random assumption, based on Prior Probability theory as 
developed by Jaynes [7]. Deep Random assumption is an objective principle to assign probability, 
compatible with the symmetry principle proposed by Jaynes [7]. 
Before presenting the Deep Random assumption, it is needed to introduce Prior probability theory. 
If we denote    the set of all prior information available to observer regarding the probability 
distribution of a certain random variable   (‘prior’ meaning before having observed any experiment of 
that variable), and    any public information available regarding an experiment of  , it is then 
possible to define the set of possible distributions that are compatible with the information      
   regarding an experiment of  ; we denote this set of possible distributions as: 
   
The goal of Prior probability theory is to provide tools enabling to make rigorous inference reasoning 
in a context of partial knowledge of probability distributions. A key idea for that purpose is to consider 
groups of transformation, applicable to the sample space of a random variable  , that do not change 
the global perception of the observer. In other words, for any transformation   of such group, the 
observer has no information enabling him to privilege   ( )   (   | ) rather than     ( )  
 (   ( )| ) as the actual conditional distribution. This idea has been developed by Jaynes [7]. 
We will consider only finite groups of transformation, because one manipulates only discrete and 
bounded objects in digital communications. We define the acceptable groups   as the ones fulfilling 
the 2 conditions below: 
(  ) Stability - For any distribution      , and for any transformation    , then         
(  ) Convexity - Any distribution that is invariant by action of   does belong to    
It can be noted that the set of distributions that are invariant by action of   is exactly: 
  ( )  {
 
| |
∑    
   
|      } 
The set of acceptable groups as defined above is denoted: 
  
   
 
For any group   of transformations applying on the sample space  , we denote by   ( ) the set of all 
possible conditional expectations when the distribution of   courses   ( ). In other words: 
  ( )  { ( )   [ | ]|      ( )} 
Or also: 
  ( )  { ( )  ∫   ( )  
 
 
|      ( )} 
The Deep Random assumption prescribes that, if     , the strategy    of the opponent observer  , 
in order to estimate   from the public information  , should be chosen by the opponent observer   
within the restricted set of strategies: 
     ( )                                                                      ( ) 
The Deep Random assumption can thus be seen as a way to restrict the possibilities of   to choose his 
strategy in order estimate the private information   from his knowledge of the public information  . It 
is a fully reasonable assumption because the assigned prior distribution should remain stable by action 
of a transformation that let the distribution uncertainty unchanged. 
( ) suggests of course that    should eventually be picked in ⋂   ( )    , but it is enough for our 
purpose to find at least one group of transformation with which one can apply efficiently the Deep 
Random assumption to the a protocol in order to measure an advantage distilled by the legitimate 
partners compared to the opponent. 
Back on the presentation of protocol  (introduced in [9]) 
The following protocol has been presented in [9]. In order to shortly remind the notations, let’s set 
  (       ) and   (       ) some parameter vectors in [   ]
  and   (       ) and 
  (       ) some Bernoulli experiment vectors in {   }
 , we denote : 
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In that protocol, besides being hidden to any third party (opponent or partner), the probability 
distributions used by each legitimate partner also need to have specific properties in order to prevent 
the opponent to efficiently evaluate    by using internal symmetry of the distribution. 
  
  
Those specific properties are: 
(i) Each probability distribution   (for   or  ) must be « far » from its symmetric projection 
 ̅( )  
 
  
∑    ( )     
(ii) At least one of the distribution (of   or  ) must avoid to have brutal variations (Dirac) 
The technical details explaining those constraints are presented in [9]. The set of compliant 
distributions is denoted  ( ) where   is a parameter that quantifies the « remoteness » of a 
distribution from its symmetric projection. 
For such a distribution  , a tidying permutation, denoted   , is a permutation that realizes the 
minimum (or maximum): 
   
    
( ∑ ∫   ( )  ( ) ( )  
 
[   ]          ̅
) 
where    {    
 
 ⁄ }. Minimizing the above criteria is an efficient way to ensure that      is 
driven away from its symmetric projection. Again, details are presented in [9]. 
Here are the steps of the proposed protocol: 
  and   are the legitimate partners. The steps of the protocol  (         ) are the followings: 
Step 1 – Deep Random Generation:   and   use their respective DRG to pick independently the 
respective probability distributions   and    ( ).  (resp.   ) is then secret (under Deep Random 
assumption) for any observer other than   (resp.  ) beholding all the published information.   (resp. 
 ) calculates a tidying permutation    (resp.    ) of   (resp.   ).    draws the parameter vector 
  {   }  from .   draws the parameter vector   {   }  from  . 
Step 2 – Degradation:     is a public Degradation parameter;   generates a Bernoulli experiment 
vectors   {   }  from the parameter vector    ⁄ .   publishes  .   generates a Bernoulli experiment 
vectors   {   }  from the parameter vector    ⁄ .   publishes  . 
Step 3 – Dispersion:   and   also pick a second probability distribution respectively  and    ( ) 
such that it is also secret (under Deep Random assumption) for any observer other than   (resp.  ).  
is selected also such that ∫  ( )  
 
| | [ | | √   | | √ ]
 
 
 √ 
 in order to ensure that | | is not an 
unlikely value for  |  ⁄ | (same for   by replacing   by   and   by  ).    (resp.   ) is used to 
scramble the publication of the tidying permutation of   (resp.  ).   (resp.  ) calculates a 
permutation   [ ] (resp.    [ ]) representing the reverse of the most likely tidying permutation on   
(resp.  ) to produce   (resp.  ). In other words, with  ,   [ ] realizes : 
   
    
∫ ( | )      
  ( )  
 
 
 
Then   (resp.  ) draws a boolean   {   } (resp.   ) and publishes in a random order (     )  
  (  [ ]   ), (resp. (       )   
  (   [ ]    )) where   represents the transposition of elements in 
a couple. 
  
(we remark that it is possible to publish only (  (  )   (  )) and (   (  )    (  )) rather than 
(     ) and (       ), which leads to quantity of bits of    instead of       ). 
Step 4 – Synchronization:   (resp.  ) chooses randomly    (resp.   )  among (       ) (resp. 
(     )). 
Step 5 – Advantage Distillation:   calculates    
  
  ( )  
  ( )
 
,   calculates 
   
  
  ( ) 
  
  ( )
 
.    and    are then transformed respectively by   and   in binary output thanks 
to the sampling method: 
  ̃  ⌊
(    )√  
 
⌋      ,   ̃  ⌊
(    )√  
 
⌋       
(where   is a translation parameter randomly picked in [  
  
√  
[ at each instance of the protocol). The 
multiplicative factor   is chosen such that: 
 
√  
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We introduce the following notations corresponding to the canonical form of the opponent strategy to 
estimate    (obtained in [9] Proposition 9): 
  (           )  
  ((∑        (  ) ) (∑        (  ) )  (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ) (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ))
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⌋       
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    ) } 
where     is the permutation chosen by   among (     ) as    and     is the permutation chosen by 
  among (     
 
 ) as   . The partners discard then the instance of the protocol if |  |   . 
Step 6: classical Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification (IRPA) techniques then lead to 
get accuracy as close as desired from perfection between estimations of legitimate partners, and 
knowledge as close as desired from zero by any unlimited opponent, as shown in [4], [11]. 
 
The choices of the parameters (         ) are theoretically discussed in proof of main Theorem in 
[9]. They are set to make steps 5 and 6 possible. 
The protocol can be heuristically analyzed as follows: 
Regarding the legitimate partners: 
(1) when   picks       and   picks        (  ⁄  of cases), the choice of    and    remain 
independant from    , so that   and   remain draws of independent Bernoulli random variables, 
  
then allowing to apply Chernoff-style bounds with accuracy  (
 
√  
) ( [(  |      
 
  |     )
 
]
 
 ⁄
  (
 
√  
) as shown in [9]). 
(2) When   picks       [ ] and/or   picks      [ ] (  ⁄  of cases), the Chernoff bound no 
longer applies and instead, and    or    become erratic, which will lead to an error probability 
of   ⁄ . 
On the other hand, the discarding condition |  |    forced at step 5 imposes that the opponent has no 
better choice than to choose its bit   ̃ randomly within {   } with 50% chance. Thus, as soon as we 
can prove that condition |  |    and condition (1) above coexist with a fair probability   , we have 
shown that an Advantage is created for the partners over the opponent. This fact is proven in [9] 
Theorem 1. The main argument of the proof is that, in the estimation   (           ) of    by 
opponent, the opponent’s choices among (     [ ]) for     and among (       [ ]) for     are 
indistinguishable under Deep Random Assumption, and therefore the choice (       )  (      ), 
which has a fair occurrence probability (3/4), leads to opponent’s erratic behavior creating a fair 
occurrence probability that condition |  |    and condition (1) above coexist. 
 
Below we explain the role of each step: 
The Degradation transformations   
 
 
 and   
 
 
 with     at step 2 are necessary so that 
  [ ](  )    (  ) (resp.    [ ](  )     (  )). If    , then     and     and this would cause 
  [ ](  )    (  ) (resp.    [ ](  )     (  )). 
The Deep Random Generation at step 1 prevents the use of Bayesian inference based on the 
knowledge of the probability distribution. In particular, if     (resp.      ) were not managed by 
Deep Randomness,   would be able discriminate    among (     ) (resp.     among (       )) by 
Bayesian inference. 
Dispersion step 3 mixes    within (     ) with another permutation   [ ] (and     within (       ) 
with another permutation    [ ]).   is entirely determined by | | and a permutation, which explains the 
constraint and transformation applied on   in step 3 to make    and   [ ] indisguishable knowing   
(same with    [ ],    , and  ).   [ ] is (1) indistinguishable from    knowing 
   {    (     ) ( 
 
   
 
 )}, and (2) causes that   [ ]
  ( ) and   
  ( ) behave very differently 
due to the fact that   [ ]
  ( ) only depends on | |; indeed we remark that         [ ( )]
     
  [ ]
  , and therefore,   [ ]
  ( ) is stable by action of    on  . (resp.    [ ]
  ( ) only depends on 
| |). That indistinguishability can be expressed under Deep Random assumption by the symmetry    
associated to the group {    } (  being the transposition of pairs) applied to (     ) and ( 
 
   
 
 ). 
Associating    with other symmetries presented in the proof of [9] Theorem 1, we manage to show 
that the best strategy of the opponent under Deep Random assumption to estimate    and then as a 
consequence   ̃, are:  
  (           )  
  ((∑        (  ) ) (∑        (  ) )  (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ) (∑        (  )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ))
  
 
  
  ̃(       )  ⌊
(  (           )   )√  
 
⌋       
where     is the permutation chosen by   among (     ) as    and     is the permutation chosen by 
  among (     
 
 ) as   . 
The synchronization step 4 needs that the distributions to have special properties (  ( )) in order to 
efficiently play their role. It is efficient in   ⁄  of cases (when   picks       and   picks       , 
which we will call ‘favorable cases’). If    and     were chosen randomly by   and   instead of 
being the respective tidying permutations of   and  , then   could, even without knowing    and  , 
use     (   )  
 | || |
  
 in order to estimate say    with accuracy  (
 
√  
), in which case   ̃  
[
(      )√  
 
] would be as close to   ̃ as   ̃ in favorable cases. 
The step 5 is called Advantage Distillation because at this step, thanks to the discarding condition 
|  |   , we have managed to create, under Deep Random Assumption, a protocol in which the error 
rate for the legitimate receiver is strictly lower than the error rate for the opponent. 
We remark that the condition |  |    plays also another role which is to protect against the 
unexpected predictability effects of using an error correcting code at Reconciliation phase. Indeed, 
unlike QKD protocols (protected by no cloning theorem) or Maurer’s satellite protocol presented in 
[5], in our case the opponent can try the various possible combinations of choice for     and    , and 
compare them in terms of matching a code word. To illustrate the issue, let’s consider the non-optimal 
‘bit repeating’ error correction method described by Maurer in [5]: the codeword     chosen by   can 
only be (       )  or (       )  depending on      or     .   could then publicly discards all 
decoded sequence    that is not (       )  or (       )  and obviously decodes accordingly      
if |  |   , and      if |  |   . In such scenario, if, for one of the instance   within the 
sequence, we have        and    (       ) (or    (       )), then it is clear that the code 
word is (       )  (or (       ) ). This example shows how, even with Deep Randomness 
indistinguishability applied locally to each instance, the opponent can still take advantage of an 
imprudent implementation of the error correcting method to break the secrecy. The condition |  |    
also have the advantage to avoid such predictability flaw. 
II. The “bit reuse and recombine” optimization technique 
The protocol described in Section I requires to exchange    bits (      (  )   (  )    (  )    (  )) in 
order to distill   ̃ and   ̃. This is extremely costly, considering that   should be sufficiently large in 
order to let the law of large numbers produce its effects with the Bernoulli variables    and    in 
favorable cases. 
The technique that we present in this section makes this multiplication factor to vanish by reusing 
draws without decreasing the entropy of the output digit flow. It thus represents a dramatic 
improvement of performance. 
Here is how it works. 
When the protocol is used to transmit a message , the transmission is sequenced in successive blocks 
of   instances of the steps 1 to 4 of the protocol. Each block enables to distill   bits   ̃ and   ̃ with a 
  
reuse and recombine technique that is detailed below. Then Information Reconciliation and Privacy 
Amplification (IRPA) can be applied on those   bits flows to distill fully secure    and    bit flows. 
 
Fig.1 
We denote by   the sequence number of a transmission block, and     
  the instance number, and 
     
  the index of the output   ̃ (resp.   ̃) digit. Then, the recombination uses the following 
variables: 
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We have to justify that (conservation of Entropy): 
 ({  ̃(   )}   
  
 )   ({  ̃(   )}   
  
 )     
Let’s take {  ̃(   )}   
  
  (by symmetry, the result is the same for {  ̃(   )}   
  
 ). One can view 
  
{  (   )}   
  
  
as a linear system of size   . Let’s consider the matrix    whose line vectors are the      
  
(    ). 
The linear system above can be written as block matrix 
(
   
   
  
  
  
  
  
   
) (      
  (    )        
  (   ))
 
 
 
For each    block, we can apply the result of Proposition AII-2 in Appendix II, with the value of 
binary random variable parameter being: 
  
 
  
∫ | |    ( )  
 
[   ] 
 
and the sampling parameter   being: 
  
 √ 
√ 
 
We then have   √    (   )   (      )   , and thus  ({  ̃(   )}   
  
 )    . We note 
as well ([15],  [16]) that the probability of a random {   } matrix is singular is  (
 
√ 
). 
With this technique,   (resp.  ) generates only   pairs (  (  )   (  )) rather than  
  pairs in order to 
obtain the    distilled digits {  ̃(   )}   
  
 . 
Lastly, the fact that the lines of    are generated by a distribution in  ( ) rather than a uniform 
distribution over {   }  does not jeopardize its entropy, and thus keep the assumption that is 
nonsingular fairly reasonable. As an example of the above statement, let’s determine  ( )   where 
   is the distribution given by: 
 (∑  
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Its quadratic matrix is: 
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and it verifies (with notations introduced in [9]): 
‖       
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ‖
 
 
 
  
  (
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We show in Appendix I that  ( )   
 
 
  (    ), which suggests that the probability that    is 
singular remains small even with a distribution in  ( ). 
 
Simulations 
Simulations for the protocol with ‘Reuse and Recombine’ optimization technique are presented in 
Appendix III. 
Memory vs Bandwidth compromise 
It is clear that this technique dramatically improves the bandwidth consumption, but the price to pay is 
a dramatic increase of the memory needed by each partner to perform the optimized protocol. Indeed 
they have to create and maintain a memory structure of    bits during the duration of the protocol. 
On the other hand, it is possible to take an intermediate stance, where the partners only memorize 
    vectors instead of  . The reuse and recombine method then follows the same logic, the memory 
structure are    bits large instead of   , and the bandwidth reduction factor will be   instead of  . 
The parameter   can be chosen by a partner as his maximum possibility with regards to his memory 
capacity, and the corresponding partners can then negotiate       (     ) during an initial phase 
of the protocol. A Server-Server communication in a rare bandwidth context will use a maximum 
   , when a Client-Server will use a smaller  depending on the Client capacity. 
Combination of error correcting codes 
The bit repetition error correcting method used in [9] is clearly not optimal in terms bandwidth 
consumption, but it has the power to lower error rate starting from a very high value (close to the 
maximum 50%). Typically, in the simulations of Appendix III, we use basic bit repetition codes and 
we satisfy ourselves only by lowering the partners’ error rate below 30%, which corresponds to a BSC 
error parameter below 15%. It is established in [13] that, when the BSC error parameter is below 15%, 
it is possible to use Cascade, a more efficient error correcting protocol than the bit repetition one. 
Cascade has the drawback to be highly interactive, but it is close to optimal efficiency in terms of 
bandwidth consumption. It has also been proposed [18] to use optimized versions for BSC of LDPC 
codes initially introduced by Gallager [17], in order to avoid the interactive complexity of Cascade. 
Both Cascade and optimized LDPC for BSC work for a range of protocols including QKD and Maurer 
satellite scenario, and they are also applicable to the Deep Random Secrecy protocols in their 
Reconciliation phase. 
Therefore, it is recommended to adapt the protocol parameters in such a way that the repetition code at 
step 6 is used with the smallest possible code length needed to drive the error rate below the threshold 
where one of the above Reconciliation protocols become efficient, in order to reach an acceptable 
error rate. 
III.  The ‘non-contributive avoidance’ optimization technique 
In this section, we present another, complementary, optimization technique, that avoids non-
contributive instances. At step 4,   (resp.  ) choose randomly    (resp.   )  among (       ) (resp. 
  
(     )). Those choices lead to couples of alternative possible digit (  ̃( 
 
 )   ̃( 
 
 ))  for   and 
(  ̃(  )   ̃(  )) for  . 
It is clear that if, for a given instance of the protocol,   ̃( 
 
 )    ̃( 
 
 ) or   ̃(  )    ̃(  ), then that 
instance is equivalent to a situation where one of the legitimate partner picks its digit 50% randomly, 
which means that such instance is useless for the purpose of reaching mutual agreement with lowest 
possible error rate. We call such instances ‘non-contributive’. It is obvious that reducing the ratio of 
non-contributive instances also decreases the error rate of the legitimate receiver. 
One can use  the parameters   and   to avoid non-contributive instances. Here is how this can be 
achieved. 
We first remark that, if the following condition is satisfied: 
|  (  )    (  )|  
   
√  
 
then   ̃(  )    ̃(  ),     . Therefore,   can adapt the value of   as soon as it gets knowledge of 
{  (     )} as follows: 
  ⌈
|  (  )    (  )|
  
⌉ 
  
|  (  )    (  )|
  
 
With that first adaptation of parameter  ,   can ensure that (  ̃(  )   ̃(  )) is contributive. One can 
also remark that the above adaptation is not affected by a variation of the translation parameter  . That 
will enable   to, in turn, adapt the parameter   in order to ensure that (  ̃( 
 
 )   ̃( 
 
 )) is 
contributive, without jeopardizing the adaptation of  . To that extend,   will adapt   such that 
  ̃( 
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⌋         ̃( 
 
 ) 
which is almost always possible (except when |  (   )    (   )|  
   
√  
). 
The protocol can be adapted as follows to benefit from ‘non-contributive avoidance’ optimization 
technique (we omit in the following description to modify the protocol also with the ‘bit reuse and 
recombine’ optimization technique, but it is obvious that they can co-exist without any difficulty 
because they operate on distinct aspects of the protocol): 
A step 4’ can be added between Step 4 and Step 5 
Step 4’ – Adaptation of    :   computes the new value of   based on initial value of   and on 
{  (     )}.   publishes the new value of  .   computes the new value of   based on the new value of 
  and on {  (       )}.   publishes the new value of  . 
When combined with the ‘bit reuse and recombine’ optimization technique, the values of    , being 
different for each instance, will thus be noted        . 
  
It should be noted that publishing the new value of   does not give useful information to the 
opponent. Indeed, it is an immediate consequence of [9] Lemma 1 that |  ( )    ( )|   √  ⁄ , and 
therefore the knowledge of condition |  (  )    (  )|  
   
√  
 does not give sufficiently precise 
information about   to be able to determine   ̃. 
Similarly, the publication of   does not neither give useful information to the opponent regarding  . 
IV.  Extended protocol against active opponent 
We have introduced in [14] how the protocol reminded in Section I can be extended to include an 
authentication scheme, enabling the legitimate partners to resist to active unlimited MITM. In this 
section, we will (i) remind the results obtained in [14], (ii) show how the extension copes with the “bit 
reuse and recombine” optimization technique, and the ‘non-contributive avoidance’ optimization 
technique seen in former sections, and (iii) discuss some implementation aspects. 
The purpose of the extended protocol is still to generate a common secret bit string   between the 
legitimate partners, but this time in the perspective of an active unlimited MITM. 
Without the authentication extension, the protocol can be represented by the diagram below with the 
“bit reuse and recombine” optimization technique: 
 
Fig. 2 
The purpose of generating   is of course to transmit a secret message   from   to  . The encryption 
function   ( ) can be simply     if one want the highest security offered by one time pad, or 
another symmetric key encryption scheme working with a shared secret key  . While we have shown 
that a passive opponent cannot gain knowledge of  , it is obvious that an active opponent can insert 
himself in the communication, first playing the role of   with  , which enables him to collect  , and 
then, optionally, to play the role of   with   to transmit , or even a different message   to  . 
We will see now how to prevent this MITM attack with an extended version of the protocol  . 
  
Reminder of the security model 
In our ‘active opponent scenario’,   still has unlimited computation and storage power, but is also 
capable to (i) delete messages from the public channel, (ii) introduce new messages in the public 
channel at destination of either   or  ; (i)+(ii) is also equivalent to the capacity to modify a message 
transiting from   to   or from   to  . 
  and   are equipped with a DRG, and also with a private ‘wallet’ containing a shared authentication 
secret  , that can be updated at any time by the wallet holder. It is assumed as a pre-condition to the 
protocol that   and   have initially the same value    in their wallet. 
It is assumed that the opponent   has no access to (i) the content of a private wallet, (ii) anything 
computed or stored within a DRG. 
The goal of the extended protocol is to continue to ensure that,         
(i)  (     )    
(ii) | (     )  
 
 
|     
even with such an active opponent. 
Description of the extended protocol   
As formerly exposed in [14], the extended protocol that we propose is possible only because of a 
specific non-reversibility property of  . Indeed it is shown in [9] (Lemma3) that, when the public 
information (   ) is given, with the assumption that the distributions are synchronized, then it is 
impossible to reversely determine   or   with an accuracy equal to the one of a partner’s estimation. 
   is original because, unlike any other protocol that does not benefit from the non-reversibility 
property of Deep Random Secrecy,  it resists to opponents that are both unlimited and active MITM. 
The extension presented in [14] consists in adding a mutual verification phase after the bit string   has 
been generated, and before transmitting the secret message  .   having a length bounded by | |  
  , we denote by   the number of blocks to be sent to distill a message of length   ; typically 
  ⌈    
 ⌉ (using notations of Fig. 1). This verification is performed by: 
(i) dividing the shared secret into 2 independent piece (     ) (with  (  )   (  )  
 ( )  ⁄ ) 
(ii) sending from   to   (resp.   to  ) a verification code 
    (   {     (     )   }         
 {      (       )    }         
) 
(resp.) 
    (   {      (     )    }         
 {     (       )   }         
) 
(the characteristics of the verification function   will be discussed hereafter) 
(iii) verifying by   (resp. by  ) that the local computation 
    (   {      (     )    }         
 {     (       )   }         
) 
(resp.) 
    (   {     (     )   }         
 {      (       )    }         
) 
is equal to the received code (      ) (resp. (      ) 
  
(iv) using part of the entropy of   to renew (sending  (  )) a new value of the shared 
authentication secret    for a next round 
(v) storing by   (resp.  ) the new value of shared authentication secret    in its private wallet. 
 
Fig. 3 
Assuming that   ( )      (secret messages can be sent in both sense, which is why the diagram 
above represents   (  ) and   (  )), the common shared bit string must have length: 
| |   ( )     
in order to be able to fully renew the shared authentication secret   after each round. 
It should be noted that the above described example presents a mutual authentication. It is of course 
possible to execute the protocol with a one way authentication only if for instance, say  , is a public 
resource, in which base only   needs to authenticate to  . 
Design considerations for security 
We have shown in [14] that the authentication scheme is secure if the verification function   satisfies 
the following sufficient (but not necessary) properties: 
Property 1: 
if {     (     )   }         
 {      (       )    }         
 are known, then 
 { | (  {     (     )   }         
 {      (       )    }         
)
  (   {     (     )   }         
 {      (       )    }         
)}    
  
Property 2: 
if {     (     )   }         
 {      (       )    }         
 are known, and      
 ( (  {     (     )   }         
 {      (       )    }         
)
  (   {     (     )   }         
 {      (       )    }         
))    ( )( ) 
Property 3: 
There does not exist any non-trivial transformation   applying on the space 
{      (     )    }         
 {      (       )    }         
 such that 
    (  {     (     )   }         
  ({      (       )    }         
))
  (   ({      (     )    }         
) {     (       )   }         
) 
We propose to use: 
    ( )  ((    )     )     
 (  )
  
 (  {     (     )   }         
 {     (       )   }         
)
 (   {(   )|         }
 (      (      ̅)))
 (   {(   )|         }
 (        (      ̅)))
 (   {(   )|         }
 (     (        ̅̅ ̅̅ )))
 (   {(   )|         }
 (       (          
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)))
 (   {(   )|         }
 (      (        ̅̅ ̅̅ )))
 (   {(   )|         }
 (        (          
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅))) 
where   is a prime superior to  
 ( )
 , and {                                         } are random non-
zero integers, fixed as parameters of the protocol (not negotiated); they can typically be the successive 
outputs of a congruential generator to avoid to store all of them in memory. The permutation     is 
written above with its canonical binary form to be able to compute it with arithmetic.       ̅ is a non-
linear form on    also involving   for each                        . {    ( )} is a well known universal 
hashing class of functions, thus benefiting from the good probabilistic properties of such class. 
The modularity structure of   in terms of using blocks of the form (      (      ̅)) and composing 
them by simple   is chosen on purpose; when the sets {   (     ) } are reused in our reuse and 
recombine technique, the associated block can be reused without re-computation of the arithmetical 
operations. 
  
Eventually, note that the computation of   is obviously highly sensitive to errors in the transmission of 
the {   (     )     (       ) }, and therefore it is recommended to associate each {   (     ) } with 
an error control checksum. 
The size parameters  ( )      should also be fixed as parameters of the protocol and not negotiated, 
in order to avoid that they become also vulnerable to MITM attacks. The adapted parameters 
{       } can be let outside of the computation of   because its modification cannot do more for 
the opponent than increasing the error rate between the legitimate partners. 
V. Implementation considerations 
An implementation of Deep Random secrecy for a communicating entity (Partner A) can typically 
comprise 3 modules, as shown in the diagram below: 
 A Deep Random Generator 
 A Wallet 
 A Communication module 
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The Deep Random Generator (DRG) 
The Deep Random Generator can be implemented by using the techniques presented in [12], and in 
particular the ‘partition summing’ method to compute the synchronization permutation     for each 
new distribution   generated. 
The DRG is supported by a recursive generation process as presented in [12], and should not deliver 
any usable output before it has reached its ‘maturity period’ as defined in [12]. Once the maturity 
period has been reached, one may consider the compromise between entropy of the DRG and 
  
computation cost. Indeed, the implementation that maximizes DRG’s entropy is to continue running 
the recursive process without interruption (‘continuous’ implementation strategy), but it is at the cost 
of a significant burden on the computation power. Another possible implementation is to stop the 
recursive process once the DRG has reached maturity, and from that moment to iterate only at the time 
when the generation of a new vector   is requested. That ‘on demand’ strategy of implementation 
respects the minimal entropy requirement together with being much less greedy in computation power. 
Devices that have limited computation power (Clients) should adopt the ‘on demand’ implementation 
strategy. Some powerful entities (DRG servers) may be reserved or dedicated to generate high entropy 
Deep Randomness, and can then service other entities to “upgrade” their DRG internal state with new 
possible distributions, by using the combination process described in [12]. 
It is recommended that a DRG is implemented in a tamper resistant manner, so that the internal state 
of the generator is kept safe from memory investigation. The scope of the DRG treatments 
implemented in the tamper resistant environment depends on the tamper resistant memory capacity 
available. In the ideal, only the public information would be processed outside of the DRG, as 
suggested in the above diagram. 
The Dispersion Step involves the generation of   [ ]. Instead of trying to compute 
   
    
∫ ( | )      
  ( )  
 
 
 
it is easier to simply generate an    out of     and then to search for   [ ] that realizes: 
   
    
 ( | (  )) 
 
The Authentication Wallet 
The authentication Wallet manages the one way or mutual authentication between   and any partner 
  . The Wallet is associated with a directory called “Authentication register” where, for each 
registered partner   , the current value of the authentication shared secret (     )  is securely stored 
(typically encrypted with a master key managed by the Wallet’s user and activated by some Wallet 
credentials as generically suggested in the diagram above). For one way registered partner 
(authenticated public resources), the authentication shared secret is half empty (      ) . 
The initialization of authentication shared secret between   and    happens during a ‘registration 
phase’ in which the partners are not yet capable to authenticate each other by mean of the protocol. 
Thus, some other credential should be exchanged between   and    during the ‘registration phase’ in 
order for them to trust each other. Those ‘identification’ credentials and the initial seed of their 
authentication shared secret should be exchanged through an unauthenticated instance of the protocol 
in order to protect them in confidentiality and integrity. 
Note that there may happen a loss of synchronization of the authentication shared secret between a 
pair of partners due to network connection failures. Therefore, in order to make the protocol resistant 
to such loss of synchronization, it should be allowed to reuse the authentication shared secret a limited 
number of times (which however should be taken into account in the conditional entropy of    and 
  ). Beyond that limit, the shared secret should be considered as compromised and the partners should 
go again through a registration phase. 
  
Advanced protocols 
DR-TLS: 
The extended protocol presented in this paper supplies primitives to exchange keys, and / or perform a 
one way or mutually authenticated connection between 2 partners. It is therefore natural to question 
how such protocol could candidate to replace a popular protocol such as TLS in a post quantum era.  
Where our protocol is conceptually even stronger than TLS because it prevents by design MITM 
attacks, it does not offer the convenience of Public Key infrastructure and signature to easily ‘forward’ 
the trust from a root authority to any end-user trusting that authority to authenticate its partner. The 
concept of Public Key cryptography is, by nature, excluded from our security model because the 
opponent is supposed to have unlimited computation capacity. However, the issuance by a trusted 
authority of a digital certificate to one of the partner (single TLS authentication) or to both of the 
partners (TLS mutual authentication) can be replaced by an interactive confirmation by a trusted 
authority, supporting the registration phase: 
Suppose Partner   and Partner   want to enter into registration phase and avoid MITM attacks. Both 
are already registered with a trusted authority  . Here is how they can proceed: 
1)   informs   that it wants to register with  , and exchange a session key    with  , by using 
the mutually authenticated key exchange primitive. 
2)   requests   to exchange a session key   , by using the mutually authenticated key exchange 
primitive. 
3)   and   use the unauthenticated key exchange primitive to exchange (i) an initial seed of their 
authentication shared secret, (ii) the values of    and    as defined in the extended protocol, 
sent respectively by   and  . 
4)   sends    to   (still through their authenticated channel) which enables   to compute    and 
thus to confirm the identity of  .   can do the same by receiving    from  . 
Such method can be refined in many ways, like for instance by using Kerberos-like ticketing model in 
order to avoid that   is systematically requested by both partners willing to register to each other. 
DR-SMTP: 
One of the interest of Deep Random Secrecy compared to Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), besides 
obviously to be fully implementable with classical computing and communication resources, is that 
Deep Random Secrecy supports asynchronous protocols, due to the fact that the public information 
exchanged along the protocol can be store, duplicated, forwarded, resent at will without jeopardizing 
the security or the functioning of the protocol. This is of course not true with quantum information that 
cannot be duplicated, and therefore is by nature highly restricted to synchronous interactions. 
The above remark means that it is possible to design an asynchronous messaging protocol, such as 
SMTP, supported by the Deep Random Secrecy primitives. None of the routing devices involved in 
the communication need to be sure, or even to know about Deep Random generation, they can just be 
storage and transmission devices. 
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VI. Conclusion 
We have proposed an extended set of protocols based on Deep Random Secrecy, benefiting from 
dramatic improvement in terms of bandwidth efficiency compared to previous presented versions. 
That improvement is based on reuse and recombination of bits, and we have justified that such reuse 
does not jeopardize the entropy of the distilled secret information. 
We have provided new simulations, based on prior introduced methodology, showing in figures the 
increase of performance. 
The bit reuse and recombine optimization technique has been applied to two primitives: (i) the 
unauthenticated protocol needing no prior shared knowledge between the partners and resisting to 
passive unlimited eavesdropper; and (ii) the authenticated protocol needing a short authentication 
shared secret between the partners, and resisting to active unlimited MITM. 
We have also addressed consideration on practical design and implementation. We showed the 
different modules that should be comprised in a Deep Random Secrecy communication system, in 
particular, the DRG, and the Authentication Wallet. We have identified the important compromises 
between computation, memory and bandwidth that need to be considered, and we have discussed the 
various possibility of implementation for those modules, depending on the capacity of the host. 
At last, we have also shown how one can combine the two primitives to implement more elaborated 
protocols that could be candidate to replace popular protocols such as TLS or SMTP in a post-
quantum era. 
We have discussed the fact that the performance of the overall protocol is also highly depending on the 
performance of the Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification techniques that we use. The primitives 
and simulations presented in this paper only use the basic ‘bit repetition’ reconciliation technique in 
order to show the emergence of Advantage Distillation phenomenon. Further work, in the perspective 
of practical implementation, should study how advanced Reconciliation techniques such as Cascade or 
LDPC codes can efficiently be introduced in the protocol to improve its efficiency. 
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Appendix I: Entropy of ( )   
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Injecting the two equalities below in the above, 
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we eventually get the result.  
  
  
Appendix II: entropy in linear systems 
For     , we consider the hyper-parallelepiped  [   ]: 
 [   ]{ ( ) {   }  }(       ) {   
 |  ∑  ( )  
 
   
  }
     
 
where we suppose that { ( )  {   } } is an independent linear system. For     ,  | , we also 
consider the hyper-cubic tiling of   defined by 
       ( )  {   
 |   ⌊
( ( )       )
 
⌋    } 
where {   [   ]} are translation parameters. We eventually consider the checkerboard coloring 
function associated to that tiling: 
  ( )  ⌊
( ( )       )
 
⌋       
Our purpose in this section is to determine the entropy  ({  ( )     ( )}) depending on some 
statistical properties of the linear system { ( )  {   } } and the translation parameters {   [   ]}. 
Proposition AII-1: 
We consider the case where | ( )|   , and  | , and        . If   is equidistributed over 
 [   ], and if   ⁄        , then we have ({  ( )     ( )})    
  As   ⁄         and    , there exists a vertex (       ) of the tiling that is contained in the 
interior strict of  . The linear system being independent, there are    cells that are neighboring the 
vertex and each of them represents a unique combination of {  ( )     ( )} in {   }
 . 
 
With the above diagram, one can see that this argument ensures, by    translations in any 
dimension, that any combination of {  ( )     ( )} in {   }
  has the exact same number of inverse 
images by the equi-partitioning surjective function  ̃. The distribution of   being equidistributed over 
 , the above implies that  ({  ( )     ( )})   .  
The above situation is fairly simple due to the fact that   is equidistributed over  [   ]. We consider 
now the more complex situation where   is distributed over [   ] , and {  } are independent random 
variable, all being equidistributed over [   ]. In order to simplify the computations, we will also make 
the reasonable assumption ( ) that,   : 
 
 
∑∫   ( )  ( ( ))  ( )
 
{   } 
 
   
                                                      ( ) 
  
Proposition AII-2: 
We consider the case where the system { ( )} is a random linear system of independent vectors 
in {   }  also verifying ( ), and being statistically anisotropic; If   is distributed over [   ] , 
then we have 
 ({  ( )     ( )})      
 
(    √    (   )   (      )) 
  By considering the statistical translations of the tiling        ( ), we obtain that the average 
number of solution   [   ]  for the linear system: {  ( )     ( )}    {   }
  is given by 
 [
   ([   ] )
   (       )
] 
Then obviously,    ([   ] )   . By denoting   the matrix associated to the linear system { ( )}, we 
can express the volume of the hyper-parallelepiped         as: 
   (       )     (     )     ( [   ])  ∫ |   (
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By applying classical convexity inequality, we get: 
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   ([   ] )
   (       )
]  
 
 [   (       )]
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We have of course 
     ∑  ( )∏  ( ( ))
 
       
 
and due to the fact that the vectors are independent and statistically anisotropic (which means that 
 ( ) has the same probability than  ( ( ))), it is equivalent, when computing  [(    ) ], to assume 
that the matrix   has independent binary random elements with parameter  . One can thus apply the 
result of lemma AII below, and get: 
 [
   ([   ] )
   (       )
]    √    (   )   (      ) 
Eventually, the average number of solution   [   ]  for the linear system: {  ( )     ( )}    
{   }  is lower bounded by 
  √    (   )   (      ) 
  
  
The following lemma gives a proof for a variation of a well-known result: 
Lemma AII 
Let   be a random matrix whose elements are independent binary random variables with 
parameter  . Then we have: 
 [(    ) ]      (   )   (      ) 
  We use the same combinatorial technique than in [9] Lemma 2. We denote, for     ,     ( )  
   (      )  {   ( )   } and | |      (    ( )). 
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Reordering by using        , and seeing that  ( ) ( )   (   )   (    )   ( ), we get: 
 [(    ) ]      ∑  ( ) | |
    
 
For   a subset of    we define by | | the cardinality of   and    the subgroup of    including 
permutations for which     ( )   . We will use the general inversion formula, for any function 
       : 
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We first establish a relationship between   and  : 
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This formula can be reversed by using the classical matrix inverse: 
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(which can be easily seen by considering for instance the inverse of the   [ ] endomorphism 
 ( )   (   )). 
By setting        and       , we have (   
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), and thus: 
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from which we take the reverse formula: 
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Thanks to the above, by choosing  ( )   ( ), we can write  [(    ) ] depending on  ( ) as 
follows: 
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As soon as   ,    contains a transposition   and we have       , which implies that 
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and therefore,  
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Injecting the above in (      ) we get: 
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Appendix III: Simulations for the optimized protocol 
Handling dummy DRGs 
In our simulation, we don’t focus on DRG. The DRG of each partner is emulated from the fixed 
distribution   in  ( ) with         . 
Input parameters, dispersion and error correcting 
The simulation is executed for a given set of parameters (       ) and, at each execution, it repeats 
  times the protocol. The dispersion is simulated by the generation of   [ ] (resp.    [ ]) in such a 
way that     [ ](  ) (resp.      [ ](  )) and randomly, one time over two in average,   (resp. 
also and independently for  ) chooses       [ ] rather than       (resp.      [ ] rather than 
     ), which simulates the random choice of   (resp. also and independently for  ) among 
(       ) (resp. (     )). One can notice that it is useless to introduce random permutation in the 
draw of   because it is easy to verify that   [ ][    ]   
     [ ][  ] and thus 
       [ ][    ]       [ ][  ] 
In those simulations, we mainly focus on Advantage Distillation. The effect of Privacy Amplification 
will be discussed for one of the simulations. Information Reconciliation is not fully considered, but 
basic error correcting methods are handled at step 6 in order to lower the error rate at a level where 
efficient methods (LDPC, Cascade) can operate. We will in particular cumulate, sequentially two error 
correcting methods based on bit repetition: 
1) Bit repetition with majority decoding: the codewords     chosen by   can only be (       )  
or (       )  depending on      or     .   decodes      if there is a majority of   in 
the received sequence, and decodes      otherwise. This code is suitable to lower high error 
rates (initially close to 50%) at a reasonable bandwidth cost. 
2) Bit repetition with exact decoding: the codewords     chosen by   can only be (       )  or 
(       )  depending on      or     .   publicly discards all decoded sequence    that 
is not (       )  or (       )  and obviously decodes accordingly      if |  |   , and 
     if |  |   . This code has a much better acceleration effect on reducing the error rate 
as soon as the initial error rate is significantly lower than 50%; however, more sophisticated 
codes (LDPC, Cascade) would do an even better job. 
Behavior of the opponent 
The behavior of the opponent is tested with 2 canonical strategies among   (   ) and    (   ):  
  (   )  
 | || |
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where     is a permutation randomly chosen by   among (     ) and     is a permutation randomly 
chosen by   among (     
 
 ). The relevance of the choice of    is justified in [9] Proposition 9. 
However, the discarding action at Advantage Distillation step 5, makes strategy    totally useless 
(meaning leading to an opponent’s error rate of exactly   ⁄ ). Anyway, it is shown in [9] that any 
  
strategy is almost useless (meaning leading to an opponent’s error rate of   ⁄   ( )). Strategy    is 
adopted in the results of simulations presented below. 
Output of simulation 
Each execution of the simulation outputs 3 elements of information: 
(i) the net error rate for the legitimate partners – denoted  , 
(ii) the net knowledge rate for the opponent – denoted   , and 
(iii) a lower bound of Cryptologic Limit – denoted   . 
 (     ) and | (     )  
 
 
| can be seen respectively as the error rate and ‘eavesdropping’ rate, 
so both with values in [   ]. We decided in [9], by convention that fits the common sense, that 
 (     ) cannot be greater than   ⁄ , and  (     ) cannot be lower than   ⁄  ; indeed, if 
 (     )    ⁄  one can replace    by   ̅̅ ̅ (we then denote   
  the final choice for   ), and if 
 (     )    ⁄  one can replace    by   ̅̅ ̅ (we then denote   
  the final choice for   ). And 
therefore, we can define   as the net error rate, and    as the net knowledge rate (by the opponent), 
with the following formulas: 
(i)    (    ( (     )    (     )))    (     
 ) 
(ii)     (   ( (     )    (     ))  
 
 
)   ( (     
 )  
 
 
)     
   as introduced in [9], represents the rate of perfectly reliable bit transmitted over the total amount of 
bit transmitted, which in the case of the protocol is: 
(iii)    
  
   
(      ) (one can remark that it is possible to only transmit   (  ) instead of 
  , which can be coded with   bits instead of       ). 
The 3 output information are measured as averaged over all the   repetitions of the protocol within an 
execution of the simulation. 
Presentation of the results 
We have executed series of simulations with variations of parameters (     ), and with   being 
sufficiently large so that the residual quantity of distilled digit is at least       . 
In the following results, the sampling parameter   is expressed as a multiple of  
 
 √  
. 
In all the graphics below, the abscissa represents the coursing parameter values, the left ordinate 
represents the values of error rate   and knowledge rate   , the right ordinate represents the values of 
the Cryptologic Limit’s lower bound   , and the title of the graphic gives the values of the fixed 
parameters, and the range of the coursing parameter. 
The first graphic below presents Advantage Distillation without the improving effects of error 
correcting codes. We only increase the length of the Bernoulli vector   from 5,000 to 50,000. The 
other fixed parameters are     ,     ,      : 
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We observe that the error rate is decreasing when   increases. This can be explained by the fact that it 
is needed to have large values of   in order to have a fair occurrence probability that condition 
|  |    and condition (      and       ) above coexist. Nevertheless, the error rate of the 
partners remains very high (while, as expected, the knowledge rate is remains almost null), even if 
Advantage Distillation is obtained. In terms of bandwidth, we have adopted a reuse parameter 
       , which makes    non optimal, but was needed to remain in the limit of the available 
RAM for that simulation. 
The second graphic below presents the impact of error correcting. The ‘Bit repetition with majority 
decoding’ uses a fix length of codewords equal to 31, while we increase the value of the ‘Bit repetition 
with exact decoding’ codewords’ length from 1 to 10. The other fixed parameters are         
    ,     ,        : 
 
We observe that we manage to obtain an accelerated decrease of the error rate thanks to the (non-
optimal) ‘Bit repetition with exact decoding’ technique. It is of course at cost of increasing the 
knowledge rate (which can be then rectified by Privacy Amplification). The Cryptographic limit 
decreases due to the increasing discarding attached to that technique. 
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The third graphic presents the effect of Privacy Amplification. We apply a simple Privacy 
Amplification method corresponding to the universal hashing function « multiply-add-shift » 
    ( )  ((    )     
  )          , for which parameters     are picked for each new output 
digit (distilled from sequences of    input digits). The codewords size    varies from   to   . The 
other fixed parameters are              ,     ,        , the ‘Bit repetition with majority 
decoding’ uses a fix length of codewords equal to 31, and the ‘Bit repetition with exact decoding’ 
codewords’ uses a fix length of codewords equal to 6: 
 
The reduction of the knowledge rate is of course at cost of the increase of the error rate, and at the 
overall decrease of   . This simulation is not practically relevant, because Privacy Amplification 
should be used only after a more efficient Reconciliation method is used to lower the error rate; it is 
just purposed to show the qualitative effect of Privacy Amplification in the context of a simplistic 
version of the Deep Random secrecy protocol. 
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